-1-
Introduction
Diminishing transportation and communication costs facilitate contacts among culturally distinct communities. Through these contacts, hybrid cultures are created out of the habits, norms, fashions, and manners once identified with different cultures. This process of "cultural integration" involves behavioral adjustments that become sources of social tension. The consequent tensions are evident in the ubiquity of campaigns to protect existing cultures and in the emergence of increasingly vocal anti-globalization movements. Cultural integration need not affect its constituent cultures symmetrically; a hybrid culture may draw more from one culture than another. Indeed, much cultural protectionism is motivated by perceptions that cross-cultural influences are promoting the spread of certain strong cultures at the expense of the rest.
Currently the social sciences lack an analytical framework suitable to the systematic exploration of such themes. Even the prevailing definitions of culture are problematic, either because they preclude specificity or because they stress shared attributes. This paper defines the culture of a community as a pair of distributions that jointly give the community a distinct identity: a preference distribution and an equilibrium behavior distribution. This focus on distributions accommodates the internal variations that societies show in tastes and choices. In allowing preferences and behaviors to be drawn from a continuum, the paper also provides a convenient setting for studying cultural hybridization. Finally, our construct captures the tensions between individual preferences and behaviors undertaken to meet social demands; our definition is thus conducive to deriving insights into the frustrations that accompany cultural integration.
We thus explore the process of cultural integration using an explicitly dynamic theoretical framework based on both individual choice and, departing from conventional economic analysis, feedback from cultural outcomes to individual preferences. In our model, agents belong to distinct cultural groups that possess different distributions of personal preferences. Their equilibrium behaviors reflect compromises between respecting personal preferences and coordinating choices with others.
These compromises shape preferences through two distinct mechanisms. First, children's preferences are influenced by their parents' observed behaviors, so preferences in each family lineage come to reflect equilibrium choices. Second, individual preferences adjust to lessen the discontents created by discrepancies -2-between ideal and actual choices. These preference changes alter equilibrium behaviors, which then induce further preference adaptations. We demonstrate how this circle of influences promotes cultural hybridization and homogenization, and characterize both the ultimate composition of the hybrid culture and the speed of cultural change.
We rely on techniques from evolutionary game theory to describe in closed form the time paths of each agent's preferences and actions. The model utilizes a twospeed formulation, whereby gradual changes in preferences are accompanied by immediate behavioral adjustments that maintain equilibrium play. In most previous game-theoretic work on preference evolution, changes in preferences are driven by differences in biological fitness or in material payoffs. Here, by contrast, preference changes are driven by psychological forces leading to adjustments within individuals and by sociological forces inducing adjustments across generations.
That culture can have important economic consequences cannot be overemphasized. Culturally shaped preferences and behaviors may be sources of chronic underdevelopment, poverty, and inequality. Examples of cultural patterns that affect the creation and distribution of wealth include gender roles, codes of honor, work norms, consumption habits, dietary traditions, and child raising customs. Accordingly, studies of cultural dynamics can shed light on differences i n economic performance both within and across nations.
Our model speaks to two popular social objectives of our time:
"multiculturalism" and "social integration." Most variants of multiculturalism aim to preserve the multiplicity of existing cultures. For their part, social integration campaigns promote interactions across boundaries of class, ethnicity, religion, and national origin. Our analysis below points to a basic, yet generally overlooked, conflict between these two objectives. Contacts among individuals belonging to different cultural groups generate behavioral adjustments to improve interpersonal coordination, followed by preference adjustments driven by these new behaviors. In eroding diversity within and across cultures, both sets of adjustments undermine multiculturalism. Indeed, we find that the most direct approach to limiting cultural hybridization and homogenization would be to tolerate, if not bolster, obstacles to social integration. By restricting contacts across communities, one prevents the adjustments in behaviors and preferences that such contacts induce, though at the cost of violating another widely held social goal.
The analysis thus enables us to connect and interpret various other aspects of the political economy of cultural change. We are able to make sense, for instance, of assimilationist campaigns that have accompanied the formation of nations out of culturally diverse peoples. We are also able to illuminate why it is only in modern times that campaigns to preserve cultural diversity per se have become a global force. As we shall see, the process by which cultural mixing produces individual national cultures is akin to the process of "cultural globalization" whereby national cultures become more similar over time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section defines central concepts, justifies key assumptions, and places the topic in an empirical context. Section 3 describes the motivations of the individual member of a cultural community.
Using these building blocks, Section 4 models equilibrium behavior and preferences in the short and long runs within an isolated community. Section 5 introduces interactions among agents divided into multiple cultural communities and describes the dynamics of cultural integration. It shows that within-group conformity has no effect on the ultimate composition of preferences in the society as a whole. Another significant result is that members of a given cultural community gain from policies that induce non-members to become more conformist. Section 6 discusses the empirical significance and policy implications of our results.
Concluding remarks are presented in Section 7. Some proofs and auxiliary results are relegated to the Appendix.
Culture and Cultural Integration
The term "culture" admits a bewildering variety of meanings. Two leading anthropologists, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (1952) , identified 161 formal definitions, and that was a half-century ago, before the explosion of cultural studies and the advent of post-modern approaches to analyzing cultural trends.
1 Some definitions treat cultural communities as undifferentiated masses. 2 Others, including some offered by economists, consider culture a vehicle for providing an organization with generally accepted solutions to problems that may be tackled i n different ways. 3 For our purposes here, a culture consists of two distributions that give a community a distinct identity: a preference distribution and an equilibrium 1 For a critique of these approaches, see Kuper (1999) .
2 Said (1979) critiques these definitions, which he categorizes as "essentialist."
3 Kreps (1990) adheres to this definition. Cremer (1993) , following Arrow (1974) , defines culture as that portion of a stock of knowledge that is "shared" by a substantial segment of a group, but not by t h e general population from which that group is drawn. behavior distribution. 4 This definition allows for diversity both across and within cultures, and it accommodates the tensions that individuals experience as they try to meet social demands. Cultural integration is a process driven by such compromises.
When an agent interacts with others, his behavior is driven by two competing motives. On the one hand, he wishes to make choices that conform to his personal preferences. On the other hand, his benefit from the interaction depends on the degree to which his choices are coordinated with those of the agents with whom h e interacts There is an inevitable arbitrariness in deciding who belongs to which culture. At some level, every large cultural community is, in Anderson's (1991) words, an "imagined community" whose members are assumed to feel, whatever their differences, somehow connected. Obviously, the perceived boundaries of a cultural community may vary; an imagined cultural community is not a political community whose membership is unambiguously defined by birthplace. We abstract from this difficulty by assuming t h a t a consensus exists on everyone's cultural affiliation.
establish not that compartmentalization is useless but that it carries its own costs.
For this reason, interactions among heterogeneous individuals can give rise to behavioral adjustments that are invariant to context. To capture this invariance in a simple way, our preliminary model postulates that agents must choose a single behavior to be used with all interaction partners. This assumption is relaxed to some extent in the full model considered in Section 5.
In an isolated cultural community, incentives to coordinate would originate entirely from within the community itself. Although individuals with unusual preferences would accommodate the preferences prevailing in their own community, they would not need to make allowances for the preferences of outsiders. By contrast, in the typical cultural community, which is one that interacts with other communities, incentives to coordinate are driven in part by contacts with these other groups. As a result, each culture comes under the influence of other cultures; both behaviors and preferences are biased by interactions that cross group boundaries.
What fuels cultural integration, the process of interest here, is precisely the need to coordinate with individuals belonging to other cultures. Fulfilling this need produces gaps between individual preferences and behaviors. These gaps then induce preference changes.
One source of preference change is socialization. Most parents attempt to inculcate their own preferences into their children. At the same time, children's preferences are influenced by observations of their parents' behaviors. Thus, preferences formed through socialization reflect a combination of parental training and parental behavior. For reasons already outlined, the behaviors of parents may diverge from their underlying preferences. Consequently, the preferences of children turn out to resemble those of their parents, though in a manner biased i n the direction of cultural adaptations incorporated into their parents' behaviors. The mechanism here is similar to that developed in Kuran (1995, Ch. 10-14) , where publicly expressed preferences at odd with privately held preferences distort the evolution of the latter by influencing the process of socialization. Our mechanism also shares characteristics with mechanisms explored by Verdier (2000, 2001) . In their models, people are endowed with one of two cultural traits, and each person wants his children to inherit his own trait; the actual outcome depends on the traits of both parents, efforts devoted to socialization, and the representation of each trait in the general population. As Bisin and Verdier (2000) show, in the presence of frictions in the marriage market both traits endure in the long run, because in order to ensure the survival of their preferences those with the minority trait accept greater costs to pass down their trait than do members of t h e majority.
For an illustration, consider a Russian family that emigrates to the United States.
The parents, having been socialized in Russia, try to give their children an appreciation for Russian cuisine. At the same time, they adjust their own culinary habits to those prevalent in their new community. The food tastes that their children develop will contain more Russian elements than those of the average American; as such they will bear the mark of their parents' tastes. Yet they will also reflect the culinary adjustments that their parents made in adapting to American dietary habits. 6 Our second source of preference change is psychological. In a wide range of experimental settings, psychologists have demonstrated that discrepancies between an individual's attitudes and behavior can lead to preference changes through a phenomenon we will call self-persuasion. 7 To give one example, Freedman and Fraser (1966) find that eliciting a favorable response to a small request (to display a tiny sign containing a public service slogan on one's property) vastly increases the likelihood of compliance with a much more costly request (to install a large, ugly billboard). Evidently the very act of abiding by the initial request makes subjects perceive themselves as civic-minded, which then induces compliance with the larger request. 8 A number of different mechanisms have been proposed to explain such phenomena. The earliest explanation, Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, invokes a need for self-consistency.
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Alternatively, Bem's (1965) selfperception theory argues that preference adaptations occur as people use observations of their own behavior to "discover" their preferences. 10 Regardless of the explanatory mechanism, the well-established causal link from behavior to preferences serves as a secondary motivation for our model of preference dynamics.
Ordinarily the adaptation process under consideration operates in a largely subconscious manner. Accordingly, psychologists find that people make systematic errors when asked to predict how their preferences will evolve in response to new 6 Of course, insofar as children interact with the wider community, the tastes they develop will show even greater biases toward the norms of the society at large. For diverse data that support this example, see Douglas (1984) . Kim (2001, Ch. 7-8) elaborates on the process of culinary adaptation. For recent literature reviews, see Brehm et. al. (2002, Ch. 6) , Cialdini (2001, Ch. 3), and Aronson (1999, Ch. 4). 8 See Pliner et. al. (1974) for a related study.
For more recent elaborations on this approach, see Cooper and Fazio (1984) .
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Also see Vallacher and Wegner (1985) . Other distinct mechanisms have been proposed by Baumeister (1982) and Steele (1988 This insecurity may diminish through identity shifts that dampen inconsistencies between one's choices and self-conception.
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These prediction errors appear to be resilient to learning, which supports the finding that t h e adaptation mechanisms in question are sub-conscious. See Kahneman and Snell (1992) and Loewenstein and Schkade (1998). 12 When a person decides to take golf lessons, he does so partly to meet coordination needs. The knowledge and skills that he expects to acquire will prove useful in conversations, in developing business relationships, and in making friends. However, he may sense also that his learning process will alter his preferences: the better he is at golf, the more he will enjoy the game and, hence, the more eager he will be to play golf. Schelling (1984, Ch. 2-3) and Kuran (1998b) discuss strategies used to achieve self-transformation. For evidence on how people choose a community with a view toward t h e consequences for their preferences, see Cotton (1985) . 13 The success of such efforts depends partly on the choices of one's relatives and friends. A person who lives in an age when assimilation is encouraged, or among people who are eager to assimilate, will find it easier to reshape his identity than someone living in an environment that promotes cultural separatism. As we shall see in Section 6, cultural protectionism and separatism are alternative responses to anxieties induced by cross-cultural integration.
14 To cultivate new preferences is to have meta-preferences, in other words, preferences for one's own preferences. On meta-preferences in general, see Sen (1974) , Elster (1999), and George (2001) ; the latter two sources also contain much relevant evidence. 15 Rubin (1995) also shows that this alienation manifested itself in tensions within families and across generations, which could be viewed as a consequence of the biased socialization described above. For additional insights into the personal stresses and the interpersonal tensions generated by acculturation, see Thomas (1995) , Ahmad (1962 /1992 ), and Rodriguez (1982 . 16 For elaboration and many references, see Rubin (1995, especially Ch. 9-10); and Lowenthal (1996, Ch. 9 ).
To recapitulate, socialization and self-persuasion are two sources of preference change; the first operates across generations, the second within individuals. These two sources are not, of course, mutually exclusive. A mother might socialize her children in the expectation that the skills they acquire will enhance their comfort i n settings where coordination with others is beneficial. It is worth reiterating that i n basing our model on such sociological and psychological processes, we deviate from the game-theoretic literature on preference evolution, in which preference changes are driven by differences in biological fitness or material payoffs.
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All key components of our model have now been introduced: cultural communities whose members interact with both insiders and outsiders, limits o n situation-specific behavioral adaptations, tradeoffs between achieving individual ideals and reaping coordination benefits, and preference changes driven by social and psychological forces. We will show how these elements lead to cultural hybridization. For the time being, we are abstracting from collective action designed to mould and control cultural evolution through political means. Policy responses will be introduced later, after the model's basic implications have been explained.
We shall see that cultural protectionism, multiculturalism, and anti-globalization movements are all motivated partly by a desire to restrict or redirect the adaptation mechanisms captured here.
Coordination Payoffs and Personal Payoffs
In the illustrations given above, individual preferences and actions are drawn from a continuous range. For example, a person's diet may adjust gradually as h e varies the frequency with which he eats particular dishes or the mix of their ingredients; and parenting techniques may vary incrementally between "extremely strict" to "extremely permissive". The continuum assumption thus facilitates a meaningful analysis of the process through which a culture changes.
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In our model, agents interact in pairs. These interactions generate payoffs consisting of two components: a coordination payoff and a personal payoff. The first 17 See, for example, Güth and Yaari (1992) , Güth (1995) , Huck and Oechssler (1999) , Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000) , Ely and Yılankaya (2001) , Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) , Sandholm (2001) , and Sethi and Somanathan (2001) . 18 The assumption that the choice set is continuous stands in contrast to works on social influences in which agents make binary choices even if their preferences are drawn from a continuum. See, for example, Schelling (1973) , Akerlof (1976) , Kuran (1989) , Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) , and Brock and Durlauf (2001) . component captures the benefits agents derive directly from the interaction itself. It is a strictly decreasing function of the difference between the actions chosen by the interacting individuals. This assumption is natural in relation to the examples above. When two people dine together, their enjoyment often depends on the degree to which their attires are matched in terms of formality. If one shows up i n jeans but the other in a suit, they both feel awkward, the former because she treated the event too casually, the latter because he is overdressed. Language and knowledge of cultural meanings form another domain in which coordination helps. If one agent peppers her speech with slang while the other sticks to polite words, miscommunication and mutual discomfort are likely.
Were the coordination payoff the only payoff, the agents would face a pure coordination game, and an action pair would constitute a Nash equilibrium if and only if both agents chose the same action. But our agents also care about the identity-driven personal ideals they bring to their interactions. 19 Specifically, in any given interaction each derives a personal payoff that is a decreasing function of the distance between ideal and chosen actions, where the former is represented by an individual-specific preference parameter π. Accordingly, an individual strives to maximize not a coordination payoff but some combination of two distinct payoffs.
For tractability, we assume that every agent's utility function has a simple quadratic form. Suppose that an agent with preference parameter π chooses action x, and the person with whom he is paired chooses action ′ x . 20 Then our agent obtains the payoff
The scalar w, the conformity parameter, represents the absolute weight the individual places on his coordination payoff; the weight he places on his personal payoff is normalized to unity. If two agents with preference parameters π and ′ π play the game described by equation (1), then by substituting one agent's first order condition into the other's one finds the unique Nash equilibrium, in which the chosen actions are
That individuals derive utility from following their personal ideals has been recognized in other recent analyses of social interactions. See, for instance, Kuran (1995) and Akerlof (1997) . 20 We assume for simplicity that preferences and actions are both scalar valued. All our results can be generalized to settings where preferences and actions are multidimensional, though at the expense of greater notational complexity.
The value of w is culture-specific. It is meant to capture the importance that the agent's community attaches to coordination, and hence to conformity.
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Communities need not be equally eager to coordinate the behaviors of their members. Some communities seek to enforce a strict dress code in restaurants and at public ceremonies; others allow considerable diversity in level of formality. In our full-blown model with multiple communities, the weight the individual places o n coordination depends on his community membership, and also on whether his interaction occurs within his own community or with an outsider. But it will be instructive to begin by studying equilibrium behavior and preference evolution within an isolated community.
Cultural Evolution within an Isolated Community
Let A = [0, 1] represent the set of agents in a single isolated community. While the term "agent" is used for convenience, each α ∈ A actually represents a single multigenerational lineage. Agent α's preference parameter at time t is denoted by Π t (α) ∈ R, and the set of all agents' preference parameters by the preference profile Π t : A → R. Similarly, X t (α) ∈ R represents agent α's action at time t, and X t : A → R the corresponding action profile. We assume that both preference and action profiles are uniformly bounded over all finite time spans.
To describe the average preference and average action within the community, we use notation from probability theory. In particular, E denotes the expectation operator for functions defined on A. With this notation, 
The Short Run: Equilibrium Behavior
Suppose that the agents who form the community are repeatedly paired at random, and that the total payoff of each from any interaction is determined by the utility function u defined in equation (1). As is usual in evolutionary models with random matching, we assume that agents condition their behaviors on information about the distribution of actions of potential match partners rather than on the 21 In practice, it will also vary across contexts, but this is a detail that we do not pursue here. particular partner with whom they are matched. For reasons given in Section 2, this assumption is natural in settings where it is costly to switch actions continually to accommodate the characteristics of different match partners. It is also reasonable i n contexts where agents find it hard to anticipate how specific partners will behave.
Given this setup, agent α chooses an action x which maximizes his expected utility,
2 2 Π α .
The action profile X t is a Nash equilibrium of the random matching game if for all agents α,
It is easy to show that this game has a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Fix the preference profile Π t . The unique Nash equilibrium of t h e random matching game is
Proof: Taking the first order condition, we see that if X t is a Nash equilibrium, then for each agent α ∈ A, the action ˆ( ) X t α must satisfy
Taking expectations and canceling like terms, we find that E X t = EΠ t . Substituting this expression into the previous equation and rearranging establishes the proposition.
In the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, each agent α selects an action that is a weighted average of his own preference Π t (α) and the average preference in the population EΠ t ; EΠ t itself equals the average equilibrium action E X t . The weight placed on the average preference is an increasing function of the conformity parameter w.
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The Long Run: Preference Evolution
The Nash equilibrium (2) describes the behavior of the community at a single moment in time. Over longer time spans, the distribution of preferences in the community evolves in response to this equilibrium behavior. As described i n Section 2, preference changes are driven by two forces: socialization and selfpersuasion. We capture both of these forces through the dynamic
This equation states that the preferences of agent α move in the direction of that agent's current equilibrium behavior, at a rate proportional to the distance between them. It implicitly defines a two-speed adjustment process. At each moment, the population follows an equilibrium defined by equation (2), which is uniquely determined by its current preferences. Discrepancies between individual agents' equilibrium behaviors and underlying preferences cause the latter to change according to equation (P).
Equation (P) requires that during preference adaptations, adjustments i n behavior to maintain equilibrium play occur instantaneously. This ordering of the rates of change seems natural: while an agent can quickly switch actions, preference change, whether within or across generations, is a gradual process. By assuming that behavior adjusts an order of magnitude more quickly than preferences change,
we capture these relative rates in the simplest possible way.
This assumption about relative rates is the standard one made, sometimes implicitly, in the game-theoretic literature on preference evolution. However, our model differs from this literature in important ways. Instead of looking merely for the stable equilibria of the process of preference evolution, we seek to describe explicitly the preference and behavior trajectories associated with any initial preference profile. Also, as noted earlier, we attribute preference changes to socialization and self-persuasion, rather than differences in reproduction rates or material payoffs.
22 Equation (P) describes a cyclical relationship connecting preferences and behaviors. The trajectory of agent α's preferences, Π t (α), depends on his equilibrium behavior, ˆ( ) X t α . By definition, this behavior depends on the other agents'
22
Some models of preference evolution (e.g., Güth and Yaari (1992) and Dekel, Ely, and Yılankaya (1998) ) assume that players can observe and condition their behavior upon the personal preference of their partner in a match. We assume to the contrary that such conditioning is impossible.
behaviors, which in turn depend on their preferences. Hence, the evolution of the preference Π t (α) depends on the entire preference profile Π t . It follows that the evolution of agent α's preferences cannot be studied in isolation: to solve equation (P), one must describe the preference changes of all agents simultaneously. Proposition 2 characterizes this solution.
Proposition 2: Fix an initial preference profile Π 0 . The unique solution to equation (P) from this initial condition is
Proof: Substituting equation (2) into the preference dynamic (P), we obtain
Differentiating under the integral sign and substituting yields
, from which it follows that EΠ t = EΠ 0 for all t. Substituting this expression into equation (4) yields the ordinary differential equation
The solution to this ODE is equation (3).
We illustrate the solution to (P) in Figure 1 , which presents an example of preference and behavior distributions at two times, 0 and t. 23 The initial preference distribution corresponding to the preference profile Π 0 determines (via equation (2)) a corresponding equilibrium behavior profile X 0 , whose distribution is also shown. Note that each of the agents α, β, γ, and δ chooses a behavior that lies closer than his personal preference to the mean preference EΠ 0 . In the aggregate, the distribution of behaviors exhibits less dispersion about EΠ 0 than the distribution of preferences.
Over time, each agent's preference adjusts in the direction of his equilibrium behavior, according to the law of motion (P):
The rates of change for agents α through δ are represented by arrows drawn beneath the distributions. Since each agent's preference moves in the direction of EΠ 0 , the 23 These distributions should not be confused with the actual preference and behavior profiles, which are maps from the unit interval to the real line. preference distribution is less diffuse at time t than at time 0. This concentration causes a corresponding change in equilibrium behavior, which leads to further changes in preferences. In the limit, all preferences and behaviors converge to the initial mean preference EΠ 0 . Thus, the cultural community becomes entirely homogeneous in terms of both preferences and behaviors.
Figure 1: Equilibrium behavior and preference evolution in an isolated community. The horizontal axis represents preferences and equilibrium behaviors, and the vertical axis represents frequencies. The two diagrams illustrate preference and behavior distributions at the initial time 0 and at some later time t.
Interactions across Cultures
To explore the dynamics of cultural integration, we now introduce interactions among agents divided into multiple communities. For the time being, we continue to assume that the sets of agents in each community are fixed over time; Section 5.2 extends this analysis to a setting in which the communities grow over time.
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Communities of Fixed Sizes
As in the single-community case, agents interact in pairs, and each member of a matched pair receives a coordination payoff and a personal payoff. But now the importance an agent attaches to coordinating his behaviors with those of others depends on both his own communal affiliation and that of his partner. W h e n interacting with someone from his own community, the weight that an agent belonging to community i attaches to his coordination payoff is the within-group conformity parameter w i . If this agent has preference parameter π and plays action x while his partner plays action ′ x , his total payoff is
π .
If instead this agent is paired with someone from community j, the weight h e attaches to his interaction payoff is given by the across-group conformity parameter a i . Accordingly, his total payoff is
It is natural to assume that w i ≥ a i . Communities are less tolerant of internal differences than differences across communities. Indeed, the very concept of a community presumes greater commonality among members than between members and non-members; and, as we will see in Section 6, members who deviate substantially from the communal norm often endure heavy conformist pressures.
By contrast, non-members are already expected to behave differently, and as long as they remain "outsiders" their "deviance" will not necessarily induce retribution. One of the authors of this paper was in Tunisia for a conference, and a number of the participants were invited to dinner at the home of a professor known to shun alcohol for religious reasons. An American guest showed up with a bottle of wine, which prompted the Tunisian guests to chuckle. Had a Tunisian professor brought the same gift, his faux pas would have been treated less as a source of The effect of the differentiation in question is to make each agent relatively more eager to coordinate with members of his own community than with those of other communities. We also assume that a i > 0. This ensures that coordination across communal boundaries, while pursued less vigorously than internal coordination, is still considered beneficial.
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In our model of a single cultural community, we assumed that agents were unable to tailor their behavior to the specific partner in a random match, arguing that interaction-specific conditioning of behavior is difficult to manage. To capture the existence of segregated spaces, we allow interactions to occur i n three distinct locations. By assumption, each community lives in a separate neighborhood, where its members have little need to accommodate the preferences of other groups. In addition to these two neighborhoods, there is a city center i n which the two groups interact (Figure 2 ). We suppose that each agent has some interactions in his own neighborhood and some in the center, but none in the other neighborhood. If c i represents the percentage of interactions that each group i agent has in the center, then the remaining percentage 1 -c i of that agent's interactions occur in his home neighborhood.
amusement than as an occasion for derision. For systematic evidence on differentiation according to group affiliation, see Anderson (1991) , especially Ch. 2-3 and 8, and Prentice and Miller (1999) . Elster (1989, Ch. 3) and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) offer complementary observations.
The alternative assumption is considered in Section 6.3.
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See Landa (1994) for a study of ethnic trading networks.
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Although such programs might allow, even encourage, participation by members of other communities, their primary purpose is to serve current community members. Our agents may behave differently, then, depending upon whether they are i n their own neighborhood or in the center. At the same time, to respect our premise that it is costly to switch actions from moment to moment, we require each agent to choose the same action for all interactions occurring at a single location.
Equilibrium Behavior
To analyze this model, we must first compute equilibrium behavior at each location. Since interactions within each neighborhood are homogenous, Proposition 1 may be used to characterize the neighborhood equilibria. Thus,
To analyze behavior at the city center, we assume for convenience that all 
With this expression in hand, we can determine equilibrium behavior at the city center.
Proposition 3: Fix the preference profiles Π t 1 and Π t 2 . The unique city center equilibrium is 
Proof: In the Appendix.
In the unique Nash equilibrium at the city center, each player's optimal action is a weighted average of his own community's mean preference, the mean preference in the other community, and his own personal preference. Note that by taking expectations of both sides of equation (7) and rearranging , we obtain
We see here that mean behavior in each population is a weighted average of mean preferences in the two populations; o i gives the weight placed on the other population's mean preference. Substituting this expression back into equation (7), we find that
Hence, the distance between agent α's behavior and his population's average behavior is proportional to the distance between his preference and his population's average preference; the ratio between these differences is p i .
Welfare Implications
Before proceeding to our analysis of preference evolution, we explore the welfare implications of changes in the across-group conformity parameter a i .
Proposition 4:
For appropriate choices of κ ⋅ > 0, we have that
Part (i) of the proposition establishes that raising community i's across-group conformity parameter a i lowers its aggregate personal payoffs. However, since increasing a i improves community i's coordination payoffs both within and across groups, 28 the overall impact of this parameter change is less clear. By the envelope theorem, the decline in agent α's personal payoffs caused by his change i n equilibrium action is exactly offset by the increase in coordination payoffs due to this change in action. Hence, the effect of increasing a i on agent α's overall equilibrium utility results from changes in the equilibrium choices of other agents. Part (ii) of the proposition shows that in aggregate, the effect of an increase in a i o n community i's payoffs is ambiguous. On the one hand, increasing a i reduces the variance in community i's behaviors, improving within-group coordination; the larger the variance in community i's preferences, the more significant is this effect.
On the other hand, increasing a i reduces the degree to which community j's equilibrium actions accommodate community i's preferences, reducing cross-group coordination; the further apart are the mean preferences of the two populations, the more significant is this contribution.
Finally, part (iii) of the proposition shows that increasing community i's acrossgroup conformity parameter is certain to improve community j's aggregate payoffs.
Thus, while the effects of increasing a i on the welfare of community i are subtle, the effects on community j's welfare are unambiguously positive. We will elaborate o n these points in considerable detail in Section 6, where we discuss policy implications.
Preference Evolution
In the single population setting, we modeled preference evolution by assuming that each agent's preferences adjust in the direction of his current equilibrium behavior. Now each agent has two equilibrium behaviors: one for his own neighborhood and another for the center. To address this complication, we first let λ ∈ (0, 1], and then define
Coordination improves within community i itself because increasing a i reduces the variance in t h e community's equilibrium actions. A related discussion can be found following Corollary 6 below.
as a weighted average of agent α's equilibrium behaviors in his own neighborhood and those in the city center. If λ = 1, the weights are equal to the percentages of interactions occurring in each location. More generally, the weights on city center behavior are proportional to these percentages but scaled down by a factor of λ. Using this weighted average, we define preference evolution by
As before, each agent's personal preference moves in the direction of his current "target action"; and as preferences evolve, agents adjust their behaviors to maintain equilibrium play.
Under this specification, the target to which preferences gravitate depends disproportionately on neighborhood behavior. Insofar as the source of preference evolution is socialization, this is realistic. People are more open to influences stemming from groups with which they identify. Children pay more attention to the behaviors of their parents, teachers, and classmates than they do to those of strangers they encounter on trips. Shoppers are more likely to internalize the clothing fashions of their own localities than those of places they consider culturally alien. This weighting is also appropriate for self persuasion. Having a preference inconsistent with his behavior is likely to be a greater psychological burden in the agent's home neighborhood because that is the geographic focus of his identity.
Since his compromises outside his own neighborhood are intended to achieve coordination with people who have a separate group identity, the urge to undergo corresponding preference adjustments will be weaker. 29 Although we are requiring only that λ not exceed 1, all these points support positing that λ is small. Proposition 5 describes each agent's preference trajectory under the dynamic (P2) with a fixed set of agents. If these preference trajectories are substituted into the equilibrium equation derived in Proposition 3, one obtains the corresponding behavior trajectories. 
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 states that in the long run, all agents' preferences and behaviors converge to a single point π*, which is a weighted average of the initial mean preferences in each population. The mean preference of each community converges to the limit value of π* at rate ρ*; and the preferences of an individual member of community i converge to the population mean E t i Π at rate ρ i . implying that all interactions occur at the city center. In constructing this figure, we suppose that group 1 is larger than group 2, so that the distribution of its preference profile Π 0 1 is larger than the corresponding distribution for population 2. Given these distributions, we can determine the equilibrium behavior profiles X 0 1 and X 0 2 described formally in Proposition 3. This equilibrium behavior induces preference change according to equation (P1); again, the forces driving preferences are illustrated by arrows drawn beneath the distributions. Each population shows an overall tendency for its preferences to move towards those in the other population;
however, each contains agents whose preferences move away from those of the other group.
These changes lead to new preference distributions that lie closer together than the initial distributions. The new distributions then lead to new equilibrium behaviors via equation (7) and, hence, to further preference changes. In the limit, the preferences and behaviors of both populations become concentrated at the point π*. 
Comparative Statics
We now turn to questions of comparative statics. What determines each community's impact on the limiting preference π*? group j actions to be strongly influenced by group i preferences. Therefore, as preferences in group j evolve in the direction of chosen actions, they come to reflect group i's preferences; ultimately, the limiting preference π* is determined substantially by preferences in group i. By the same logic, lowering a i , the weight that group i members place on their interactions with group j, also raises the ultimate representation of group i's initial preferences.
These results indicate that when small communities express fears about cultural erosion, they do not necessarily invoke an imaginary phenomenon. All else being equal, a small community has less influence on the character of the emerging hybrid culture than does a large community. As significantly, cultural protectionism yields results. A group that allows its members to accommodate outsiders-one with a high a i -will end up making greater cultural adjustments relative to a group that discourages outside influences. The eventual hybrid culture will bear greater similarities to the culture of the relatively closed group than to that of the open one.
From the standpoint of any given culture, discouraging cross-communal influences may not prevent change, but it will certainly lessen its degree.
Interestingly, the limiting preference is also independent of w i and w j , the within-group conformity parameters: a community with strong norms for internal coordination is no more successful at influencing π* than one in which such norms are weak. Observe that the coefficient w i determines the degree of behavioral conformity within community i. 32 While a high value of w i ensures that the actions of agents in community i are close together, it need not prevent these actions from reflecting the preferences of outsiders. Indeed, Proposition 3 (specifically, the value of the coefficient o i ) shows that the degree to which group j preferences influence the equilibrium actions of group i is independent of w i . Accordingly, increasing w i does not lower the rate at which group i preferences approach those of group j. Nor does it alter the preferences that obtain in the limit.
Finally, the limiting preference π* is independent of c i and c j , the proportions of each group's interactions occurring in the city center. To grasp this result, consider the effects of an increase in c i . Since group i now has a greater presence in the city center, group j's preferences have less influence on the actions taken by the members of group i while outside their own neighborhood. At the same time, a greater proportion of group i's interactions are in the center, which raises the 32 Equation (7) shows that the dispersion of community i's equilibrium actions at the city center is given influence of group j's preferences on group i's behavior. Of these two opposing influences, the latter dominates, accelerating the rate at which the preferences of group i come to resemble those of group j. 33 It does not follow, however, that the limit preference π* will be different, because there are reciprocal effects on the behaviors of group j. In particular, the increase in c i strengthens the short run effect of group i's preferences on group j's behavior. In sum, the rise in c i makes each group's preferences a more important determinant of the other's behavior. While this accelerates the rate at which the preferences of the two groups merge, the net effect on the limit preference π* is nil, as the two countervailing forces cancel one another out.
For completeness, we note the following comparative statics for the convergence rates derived in Proposition 5. 
Growing Communities
The preceding model oversimplifies reality by fixing the membership of each community. In practice, communities change over time through births and deaths as well as immigration and emigration. Alone or in combination, these factors can serve to sustain cultural diversity. While hybridization will still continue, the complete homogenization of Proposition 5 will not occur. Instead of converging to a point mass at π*, the preference and behavior distributions will exhibit sustained variation.
The effects of changing community size may be captured in a tractable way by introducing population growth. We now assume that the initial population masses, m 1 and m 2 , grow at rate r > 0, so that the masses of the populations at time t are m 1 e rt and m 2 e rt . We also assume that at each time t > 0, the preferences of the time t entrants to community i follow a fixed distribution which is independent of t. . This is true regardless of the value of the parameter λ.
A t
2 → R, and the corresponding action profiles are X t 1 : A t 1 → R and X t 2 : A t 2 → R. The average preference and average action in community i are given by 
Under these definitions, each community grows at rate r, and the newcomers to community i at each time t > 0 have preference distribution Π i , as we specified above.
Although sets of agents have been redefined, the remainder of the model is unchanged. 34 At each moment in time, equilibrium behaviors at the three locations are described by equations (5), (6), and (7). Given these equilibrium behaviors, the preferences of each agent alive at time t evolve according to equation (P2). To keep the notation manageable, we rewrite equation (P2) as
where the coefficients σ i and δ i are given by Indeed, the previous model can be recovered as a special case of the current one by setting r = 0.
Although explicit preference trajectories for every individual agent may still be written, the equations that describe them are complicated. We therefore focus o n limit behavior. 
According to Proposition 8, if the communities grow over time and the preferences of newcomers are exogenous, then it is no longer true that all agents' preferences converge to a single limit point. Instead, the preferences of agents i n populations 1 and 2 converge to two distinct limits, Π ∞ 1 and Π ∞ 2 , which are different weighted averages of the mean preferences of entrants, EΠ 1 and EΠ 2 .
Furthermore, the constant flow of newcomers sustains preference diversity indefinitely. This is evidenced by the fact that Π ∞ i , the limiting preference of each individual in community i, differs from E i Π ∞ , the limiting average preference of this community. When t is large (i.e., when much time has passed), the average preference Diversity is sustained also across populations. The need of each community's incumbents to coordinate with its newcomers prevents the equilibrium behaviors of agents from different communities from becoming too similar. Since preferences follow behaviors, they too remain distinct. Cultural distinctness persists even in the limit: Π ∞ 1 and Π ∞ 2 , the limiting preferences for agents in communities 1 and 2, are different, and the limiting average preferences EΠ ∞ 1 and EΠ ∞ 2 lie even further apart.
Interpretations and Policy Implications
The modeling in the previous sections offers rich insights into the phenomena discussed early in the paper. We now return to our broad themes with an eye toward extending our interpretations and drawing policy implications. We begin with the issue of cultural integration in a society expanding through immigration.
The Melting Pot
In a book on the forging of an "American culture" out of dozens of "immigrant cultures," Richard Alba (1990) observes that the ethnic backgrounds of the early immigrant communities from Europe gradually diminished in importance. Over several generations their behaviors and preferences have converged to the point where marriages between Americans of different European origins are now rarely considered intermarriages. Some "white Americans" have attachments to a few "ethnic" traditions, but these are increasingly symbolic, in that they hardly affect daily life. Nor are "ethnically different" white Americans distinguishable in terms of tastes. For all intents and purposes, the cultures they brought with them have melded to form a hybrid culture now characterized as American. This process took place at a time when the concept of Americanization enjoyed the support of powerful players, including the government and civic leaders. As our model might have anticipated, in the absence of strong counter-incentives to maintain ancestral cultures, these cultures gave way to a single hybrid culture.
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The melting pot of the United States by no means draws "ingredients" from its constituent cultures in equal quantities. The largest groups, such as the English and the Italians, have had a greater impact, say, than the Latvians and the Albanians.
36
These patterns are consistent with our model, which predicts that a group that is small, not segregated from other groups, and not hostile to cross-group interactions 35 One major group that may appear to have been excluded from this "cultural melting pot" is AfricanAmericans. This important case is considered in Section 6.3.
Consider the linguistic and literary influences of the English and the culinary influence of t h e Italians.
will endure assimilation without having a major reciprocal impact on the evolving hybrid culture. 37 
The Political Economy of Assimilation
Cultural convergence is often portrayed as a process that breeds tension and anxiety. In our analytical framework, such discontents stem from behavioral compromises. Compromises precede changes in preferences, which is why agents feel dissonance during the integration process. The individuals whose choices produce this integration would obviously be better off if they could enjoy the full benefits of their new interactions without making cultural accommodations. In other words, they would be better off if the outsiders were culturally more similar, so that they could reap the material benefits of interacting with them without needing to make adjustments in the interest of cross-cultural coordination. By the same logic, agents have something to gain from having other cultural groups make the requisite adjustments. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group i n America has not yet become an American." 39 At this time, the early-twentieth century, immigrants who opted for absorption into the American "melting pot" 37 Nevertheless, small minorities have had identifiable influences on the behaviors and preferences of other Americans. Chinese-Americans, mostly recent immigrants who form a small minority within the general American population, have already had a cultural impact. Just as beer, bagels, and pizza have become such integral parts of the American diet that their ethnic origins have stopped being noticed, "Chinese food" has become Americanized. It is marketed widely outside Chinese-American networks, and millions of Americans with no Chinese ancestry have developed a taste for it. For more on the continuing evolution of American cuisine, see Gabaccia (1998) and Belasco (1987) .
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A complementary source of such pressures, not featured in our model, consists of activists with a material stake in the preservation of cultural identities. Such activists exist in most cultural communities and are frequently opposed by activists pursuing cultural integration.
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As cited by Schlessinger (1991) , pp. 12-13. This book's first chapter offers many examples of programs and movements to promote the "melting process" through which immigrants became "Americanized."
were rewarded with promotions and status. In criticizing immigrants trying to preserve an ethnic identity, Wilson was acting on behalf of millions of alreadyassimilated Americans who wanted immigrants to shoulder the burdens of the continuing cultural integration process. His criticism may be seen, therefore, as the result of collective action aimed at protecting the prevailing host culture.
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In stigmatizing behaviors associated with immigrants, the majority imposes substantial costs on individuals who engage in traditional behaviors during interactions with the majority. Our model can capture such conformist pressures by positing a large value for the across-group conformity parameter a i , where group i represents the immigrant community and group j the incumbent population. By the logic of our model, these conformist pressures make immigrants undertake substantial behavioral compromises. According to Proposition 4, this then lowers the incumbent population's costs from cross-cultural interactions. Furthermore, according to Corollaries 6 and 7, shifting the burdens of compromise to immigrants hastens their assimilation into the host culture, and reduces their influence on the ultimate hybrid culture.
Cultural Segregation and Persistent Heterogeneity
Along with cultural activists eager to accelerate cultural convergence, there can exist activists working to accentuate cultural differences. As a case in point, there are African-American leaders who encourage their followers to differentiate themselves from other Americans. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest that the campaigns of these leaders resonate particularly with individuals who lack the resources to achieve "mainstream" ideals. Such individuals will readily participate in campaigns to mark themselves off and create separate cultures in which their skills will be more valued.
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While African-Americans undoubtedly form a culturally distinct subpopulation, this distinctness should not be overstated. In general African-American behaviors and tastes lie much closer to those of other Americans than to those of other societies, including their ancestral communities in Africa. Insofar as differences exist, they are rooted in legally mandated racial segregation. Segregation
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Of course, Wilson's policy did face some resistance. There were immigrants who issued ethnic newspapers and ran ethnic organizations to preserve some elements of their ancestral cultures. These resistors were themselves engaged in collective action intended to neutralize the pro-assimilation forces within American society.
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See Montgomery (1994) for a formal model of this phenomenon.
reduces interactions with the rest of society, thus strengthening the socializing role of one's own community and weakening that of the wider society. In line with our analysis, the preferences of African-Americans in uniform lie significantly closer to those of the armed forces as a whole than the preferences of non-military AfricanAmericans do to those of the overall non-military population (Moskos and Sibley (1997) ). The armed forces maintain a strict policy of non-segregation, which contrasts with substantial racial segregation in civilian residential and social life.
Outside the military, we find evidence of African-Americans eager to achieve cultural separation. For example, Lieberson (2000, Ch. 7 ) documents that among all major ethnic groups African-Americans form the only one whose taste for names has diverged from the rest of American society, partly because of a huge increase since the 1960s in the use of newly invented names for children. To incorporate such a case into our own framework, we must drop the assumption, critical to our previous results, that when two agents from different communities are matched, they find coordination mutually beneficial. In some social settings the members of at least one community prefer to make choices that differ from those prevalent among outsiders. In other words, they display anti-conformism in their relations with other communities.
To capture anti-conformism, we may assume that community i's across-group conformity parameter, a i , is negative. Anti-conformism introduces the possibility of cultural divergence. Not surprisingly, whether this possibility is realized depends o n the size of a i . We consider this question within the context of the fixed population model from Section 5.1. By Proposition 5, provided anti-conformism is not too strong, 42 the convergence rate ρ* is positive. In this case, group j's preference for cross-group conformity dominates group i's anti-conformism, so that the mean preferences of the two groups still converge to a common limit π*. However, since the preferences of group j members "chase" those of group i members, the limit point π* is "more extreme" than group i's initial mean preference. 43 In cases of very strong anti-conformism, group i's preferences move too fast for group j' s preferences to catch up, and the preferences and behaviors of the two groups diverge. Obviously, if both groups are anti-conformist, their preferences will move steadily away from one another, ruling out convergence to a common limit.
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In particular, if a m a m
This follows from equation (P2). For an example of this phenomenon, consider the tendency of t h e language, music, and fashion of African-American youth to be replicated after a time lag in the culture of white American youth.
Although much of this paper has focused on cultural hybridization and homogenization, it is now apparent that our model is compatible with identity transformations that sustain and even sharpen the differences between certain minority groups and the majority, even as the distinctiveness of other minority groups erodes. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) document this diversity of immigrant experiences in the United States. They find that American society has assimilated and continues to assimilate most immigrant groups, but that certain others are remaining persistently and conspicuously "different", mainly because of "reactive identity formation". 
Multiculturalism and Integration
Our analysis speaks to two of the ideals that define the politics of our age: multiculturalism and integration. The demands of the movements pursuing these goals are highly diverse. Nevertheless, each shares some basic characteristics. Most variants of multiculturalism find virtue not only in tolerating cultural diversity but also in preserving the existing manifestations of diversity. Some of its variants go even further, in that they consider cultural diversity a basic source of freedom, creativity, and even prosperity. The economic successes of the United States rests substantially on the cultural diversity of its peoples, and the same could have been said of such earlier powerhouses as the Roman, Ottoman, and British Empires. 45 For their part, the promoters of integration believe in the fundamental equality of all human beings, or at least of those sharing citizenship rights. When interactions occur without regard to race, ethnicity, national origin, or creed, they say, society reaps many benefits, including economic benefits. Civil rights laws and antidiscrimination statutes are motivated not only by considerations of fairness but also by the belief that social integration promotes economic efficiency (Frederickson (1999) ).
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Certain scholars, for example Castells (1997) and Appadurai (1996) , argue that the world is experiencing not rising cultural homogeneity but steady increases in heterogeneity, albeit of new forms as cultures are transformed through interactions. These claims are open to challenge. Yet cultural homogenization in some areas may well be accompanied by rising heterogenization in other domains of activity. A version of the model with a multidimensional choice space could easily accommodate outcomes of this sort.
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A reader edited by Goldberg (1994) contains essays that offer a spectrum of such arguments, although they also differ significantly in their positions regarding the preservation of existing cultures. See also Barber (1995) and Rao and Walton (2004) .
It is often taken for granted that these two goals, multiculturalism and integration, are mutually compatible. According to our model, there are reasons to be skeptical on this count. If social integration is encouraged, even if it is simply permitted to proceed naturally, decentralized attempts at interpersonal coordination will result in unplanned cultural hybridization. This means that pre-existing cultures will not be preserved, and also that cultural diversity will diminish.
Conversely, the goal of multiculturalism is feasible only insofar as cross-cultural accommodations are somehow blocked. The necessary restrictions may be accomplished by keeping communities apart from one another, or by removing all inclinations to conform with outsiders. Without such barriers, cross-cultural interactions lead to cultural integration.
As an example, suppose that one wants to preserve the distinctness of MexicanAmerican culture from the broader American culture. The most direct means of reaching this goal is to isolate Mexican-Americans from other Americans.
Specifically, it is to keep Mexican-Americans from sharing neighborhoods, working together, and intermarrying with Americans of different ancestries. Such requirements would impose economic costs. They would also violate the objective of social integration, which many multiculturalists share. In theory, the distinctness of Mexican-American culture may also be preserved by inculcating in MexicanAmericans a sense of cultural pride so deep that they can interact with other cultural communities without enduring undue cross-cultural influences. But there is n o evidence that Mexican-Americans as a group are averse to assimilation. Nor is it clear that cultural pride can be strengthened to the degree required for blocking cultural integration or that it would be worthwhile to incur the costs of trying to keep cultures from evolving. As a practical matter, the objective of preserving existing cultures may be untenable in a society that also values social integration.
This conclusion raises the question of why multiculturalism nonetheless enjoys a constituency. As our model shows, cultural integration may be a symmetric process that favors the culture of the majority and requires minorities to shoulder disproportionate shares of the adjustment costs. Therefore, from the standpoint of the members of an immigrant community, or of a community whose culture is considered hierarchically inferior to a "mainstream culture," cultural protectionism may serve to limit their immediate costs. Simply by slowing down the rate of cultural hybridization, and their own community's cultural assimilation, they may reduce their o w n adjustment costs, shifting the burdens partly onto future generations who, because they will have been socialized differently, will be able to adjust at lower cost. Resisting cultural integration may thus be an individually rational response.
Cultural Globalization
The process of cultural integration is not limited to geographically circumscribed nations. Steadily falling mobility costs have broken down geographic barriers that until recently permitted distant societies to develop cultural traits more or less independently. Now, cultures long considered distinct are developing common traits through mutual exposure. Culinary tastes, entertainment forms, athletic traditions, manners, and gender roles offer examples of cultural traits that are undergoing homogenization. This is one of the salient elements of the muchdebated phenomenon known as cultural globalization.
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Cultural globalization entails cultural integration at the highest level of human aggregation. It is producing a common human culture out of multitudes of national, regional, and local cultures. Among its by-products are tensions akin to those that arise as a result of cultural integration within nation-states. A common source of complaint is that the influences of national cultures are asymmetric. The term globalization is used in diverse contexts, with a variety of meanings. As Wolf (2000) notes, some definitions stress technological interdependence, others economic interdependence, and still others the diminishing importance of national borders for cultural evolution. In practice, all these forms of interdependence operate together and are mutually supportive. 47 Rodrik (1997) stresses tensions that arise through increased competition in labor markets and diminished control over choice of political regime. These factors complement those highlighted here. See McDonald (1989), especially pp. 32, 45-6, 88, 110-11. regional, national, or ethnic, no contemporary culture is a pure culture, if by that one means that all its traits are entirely homegrown and that it has been immune since time immemorial to outside influences. Today's cultures that cultural protectionists depict as pure are in fact yesterday's hybrid cultures formed through previous cross-cultural interactions. Indeed, notwithstanding massive efforts to rewrite history and discredit evidence of cultural borrowing, every culture incorporates more once-foreign elements than its protectionists try to exclude. 50 As a case in point, far more words in modern French originated outside of present-day France than the "franglais" words the French academy wants to replace with "properly French" neologisms (e.g., "la fin-semaine" for "le week-end"). Lowenthal (1996) documents the ubiquitousness of campaigns to cleanse cultural heritages of inconvenient realities. Cowen (2002) demonstrates the hybridity of cultures now considered distinct.
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For many examples see Lewis (1975) and Lowenthal (1985) , especially Ch. 5.
52
Scholars who assert that we have entered a period of rising cultural heterogeneity, including Castells (1997) and Appadurai (1996) 
Concluding Remarks
Our model predicts, then, continuing cultural integration both within and across political boundaries. As a practical matter, this means that today's cultures will undergo major transformations in coming decades; efforts to protect existing cultures from foreign influences seem doomed to fail. At the same time, until these integration processes run their course, they will induce conflicts both within countries and among them. Indeed, some of today's political instabilities are rooted partly in tensions fueled by cultural integration. These tensions have a rational basis, as do the multitudes of competing of competing movements to influence cross-cultural influences in one way or another.
Whether a given process of cultural integration is economically beneficial depends on the traits themselves. Some outcomes are simply matters of taste; as such, they have no implications for wealth creation or distribution. But others have enormous economic implications. When work norms or culinary practices get homogenized, there are important implications for productivity, health, and life spans, among other factors relevant to economic performance. So there may strictly economic reasons to adopt policies that influence the pace or nature of cultural integration. Nevertheless, the process itself is unstoppable.
The Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 
Proof of Proposition 4
To begin, we compute the signs of certain derivatives of the parameters used i n equation (7) to describe equilibrium behavior: We also alert the reader to the fact that we differentiate under the integral sign a number of times in the calculations that follow.
To prove part (i), observe that To begin the proof of part (ii) we compute 
Proof of Proposition 5
To prove Proposition 5, one applies the following result, substituting in the appropriate expressions for σ i and δ i from equations (8) 
